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Abstract 
The method in human genetics of ascribing causal responsibility to genotype by the use of heritability estimates has been heavily criticized over the years. It has been argued that these estimates are rarely valid and do not serve the purpose of tracing genetic causes. Recent contributions strike back at this criticism. I present and discuss two opposing views on these matters represented by Richard Lewontin and Neven Sesardic, and I suggest that some of the disagreement is based on differing concepts of genetic causation. I use the distinction of structuring and triggering causes to help clarifying the basis for the opposing views. 

1. Introduction
The interactionist consensus of nature and nurture acknowledges that causal influences from both genotype and environment are necessary but on their own insufficient in causing human development and behavior. This position is often considered a truism. On this background there is still the discussion on whether it is possible to separate environmental and genetic causes and quantitatively estimate the relative genetic influence on specific traits. A wide-spread method of measuring the strength of genetic influence on particular traits is heritability analysis, a statistical method based on a linear analysis of variance which has been very much discussed and criticized for several decades. 
     In 1969 Arthur Jensen published the article “How much can we boost I.Q. and scholastic achievement?” claiming among other things that the heritability of IQ is high. From this he inferred that the differences in IQ between the white and black population in the USA were due mainly to genetic differences. He found this to be a basis from where to change education policies. In the 1970’s and 1980’s many philosophers and scientists reacted against hereditarianism in general and the article of Jenssen in special. Substantial parts of the criticism were on the methodological and conceptual grounds for heritability analysis. In the article “The Analysis of Variance and the Analysis of Causes” (1976) Richard Lewontin set out to show how the analysis of variance fails to trace genetic causes, and his arguments have become an important basis for an anti-hereditarian consensus in the philosophy of science that has not been very often disturbed, although attempts have been made by some (see e.g. ref.). More recently Neven Sesardic (1993, 2000, 2003 and book manuscript in prep) has in a systematical manner tried to break down the anti-hereditarian consensus. 
      Lewontin argues that environmental and genetic causal factors are interdependent, interacting and entangled to such an extent that evaluating the individual causal contribution of these factors is, at best, difficult and demands other methods of analysis than heritability estimation based on the analysis of variance. Sesardic, on the other hand, argues that interactions between genetic and environmental causes do not represent serious obstacles in tracing genetic causes by the use of heritability analysis, and he holds that the criticism against these procedures has been greatly exaggerated. 
       I want to focus on two main disagreements between Lewontin and Sesardic (introduced in Sesardic 1993). The first one is if heritability estimates do actually trace genetic causes, and the other one is if heritability estimates are at all useful. I will argue that the former disagreement may have a basis in different conceptions of genetic causation, and that the latter has its source in different motivations and contexts of discussion. I introduce the distinction between structuring and triggering causes in an attempt to illuminate the two conceptions of genetic causation that I hold to be present in the discussion2. I hold there to be two important premises in Lewontin’s main argument opposing that heritability analysis traces genetic causes. Sesardic tries to undermine both of them, and I think he is successful in one respect, but that he is not able to undermine what I find to be the most important of Lewontin’s message.
 
2. Two versions of the interactionist consensus
There are at least two versions of the interactionist consensus: 
1.	Genetic and environmental causal factors are interdependent and interacting in the production of phenotypic traits
2.	Genetic and environmental causal factors are in principle inseparable, and their relative influence cannot be quantitatively estimated in the production of phenotypic differences.




3. Heritability, Variance and Twin Studies
In heritability analysis the phenotype is seen as a function of environment and genotype, preferably a linear function. The analysis is based on calculating variances, and the goal is to find out how much of the variance in phenotype can be attributed to genetic variance. Variance is a measure of how spread out a distribution is. More precisely it is the mean variation in the deviation of individual scores of a trait from the mean score of the trait in a sampled population, and it is calculated as the average squared deviation of each number from its mean. One key premise for heritability measurements is to assume that phenotypic variance (VP) of a trait in a population may be expressed by one component of genetic variance (VG) and one of environmental variance (VE), so that

      VP = VG + VE

Heritability, then, is a statistical measure for how the genetic contribution to a trait might vary in a population, and the heritability coefficient, H2, is given by the ratio of the total genetic variance to the phenotypic variance4:

      H 2= VG / VP

This measure is called broad heritability. There is also a measure called narrow heritability, or small h, that is only based on the additive genetic variation. Total genetic variation can be separated into additive variation, dominance variation and epistatic variation. Dominance and epistatic variation is not additive because in these cases some alleles or genes will suppress or interact with the effect of others. Broad heritability is much used when the focus is on psychological traits, as one is interested in what is the total genetic contribution to these traits. However in breeding of domestic animals one is mostly interested in narrow heritability because this measure is taken to give the best indication of what traits would be worth trying to breed. So, to sum up: Heritability is thought of as the proportion of phenotypic variance ascribable to genetic variance or in other words, as the extent to which genetic variation contributes to variations in a phenotypic trait.
      A heritability measure close to 1.0 will mean that almost all variation in the population results from variation in genotypes and nearly nothing from environment (Griffiths et al 1996, p. 832). In such a case it cannot be singled out from the heritability analysis alone whether the high heritability estimate follows from that environments measured are fairly similar in relevant conditions for the trait, or if the high estimate results from a low sensitivity of the trait to changes in environment.
      A heritability measure close to 0.0 for a trait will mean that almost all variation is due to environmental variation. The reason could be that all individuals in the measured population have identical genotypes influencing the trait, (the gene is fixed in the population) or that genotypes are very sensitive to environmental influence. 
      Personality traits, cognitive performance, alcoholism, and mental disorders like schizophrenia are some traits that have been the subject of heritability studies in human populations. The prevailing method used is twin studies. Twin studies are used because identical (monozygotic) twins share (approximately) the same genotype while non-identical (dizygotic) twins do not. If monozygotic and dizygotic twins have equally similar environments, the differences in the correlations may be expected to be due to differences in genotype. Here there is a problem of degree of environmental similarity. Monozygotic twins may be treated more similarly to each other than dizygotic twins. If this is the case, heritability can be overestimated (Griffiths et al 1996, p. 833). Adoption studies may compensate for some of these difficulties, as twins that are reared apart, can be expected to live in equally similar (or different) environments. However, such studies are very difficult to conduct, and existing high-quality results are limited. These methods of measuring heritability are also criticized for in some situations to incorporate environmental variance into the genetic variance. This might happen when the genotype is influencing what environmental factors are allowed to have an effect on traits10. But I will not discuss this any further here. 
      It is important that the analysis of variance cannot alone be expected to trace causes; it only traces correlations. However, when the analysis is used in a previously established causal context, it is normally expected to give some causal information. And as I will come to; Lewontin and Sesardic seem to disagree about the causal context of heritability analysis.

4. The Locality Objection 
Sesardic gives several examples where the major aim of heritability measurements has been explicitly stated to be the search for causality. There is a large amount of literature contesting the possibility of reaching this goal suggesting that heritability measures do not reflect the causal strength of genotype (e.g. Hirsch 1976 and Kitcher 1990). One major contribution in this respect is made by Richard Lewontin. He finds an important problem of the analysis of genetic and environmental causes to be “the analyzing into separate elements of a number of causes that are interacting to produce a single result” (Lewontin 1976a, p. 181).  He holds that “(i)f an event is the result of the joint operation of a number of causative chains and if these causes “interact” in any generally accepted meaning of the word, it becomes conceptually impossible to assign quantitative values to the causes of that individual event” (Lewontin 1976a, p.181). An example illustrating the problem is that of two men laying bricks to build a wall. If both lay bricks it is possible to measure how much each contribute by counting the number of bricks laid by each. But if one lays the bricks and the other mixes the mortar one cannot measure their relative quantitative contributions by measuring volumes of bricks and mortar. Lewontin holds this example to illustrate why we cannot ask about the relative importance of genes and environment in the production of phenotype. It is generally accepted as problematic to assign quantitative values to environmental and genetic causes. A widely employed alternative is, as previously described, using the linear model of the analysis of variance to perform a similar ascription of causal responsibility. 
      Lewontin argues that heritability analysis only give local results which cannot be generalized, and he holds this to be a significant disadvantage of the method. The amount of genetic variance in a population may depend on how environments and genotypes are distributed. If genetic variance is measured in a small range of environments, the analysis would reflect the particular environmental circumstances and, according to Lewontin, give an incorrect picture of the general relationship between cause and effect. A strong main effect of genotype is inferred when measurements are conducted in a small range of environments, while this effect is very small when measurements are evenly spread over a wide range of environments. From this follows that a trait can have a heritability close to 1.0 at some time, but this could be drastically lowered in the future by a simple environmental change. The fact that the analysis of variance depends on the means for the environment and the genotype in the sampled population makes, according to Lewontin, the analysis unable to give statements about general relations between genotype and environment on the one side and phenotype on the other. Lewontin holds that this form of spatiotemporal analysis of variance is local and is mistakenly confused with a global analysis of causes. Adopting Sesardic’s terminology I call this argument the locality objection. Lewontin (1976a, p. 184) holds that a more general or global relation between genotype, environment, and phenotype is best expressed in the norm of reaction. In an analysis of the norm of reaction, a table or graph is presented showing the phenotype that would result from the development of chosen genotypes in each possible environment. Lewontin emphasizes that a norm of reaction analysis very often gives that a single genotype may produce different phenotypes, depending on the environment in which organisms develop. The same phenotype may also be produced by different genotypes, depending on the environment (Griffiths et al 1996, p. 15). Important to Lewontin is that these relations are many-many relations with “no single phenotype corresponding to a unique genotype or vice versa” (Lewontin 1976a). Analyses of the norm of reaction illuminate that when variations in environment are low, there is a strong effect of genotype, and when the variation in environment is high, there is a weak effect of genotype. Lewontin points to the following advantage in using the norm of reactions compared to analysis of variance: the norm of reaction reflects that the phenotype is sensitive to differences in both environment and genotype in every case of analysis. Considerations around the norm of reaction show, according to Lewontin, that analysis of variance does not isolate distinct causes of variation since “the amount of environmental variance that appears depends upon the genotypic distribution, while the amount of genetic variance depends upon the environmental distribution” (Lewontin 1976a, p. 186). 
      On the other hand, Sesardic argues that we need not worry too much about the locality objection. He agrees with Lewontin that heritability analyses are local, but as long as there is a strong prevalence of the environments measured “genetic differences will tend to manifest themselves consistently in phenotypic differences” (Sesardic 1993). Sesardic argues that by making local causal inferences one is not committed to infer general or global causal relations over the whole environmental range. He points out that it “is known only (a) that in a given situation genetic differences are strongly reflected in phenotypic differences; and (b) that, very probably, the hidden underlying mechanism by which G (genes) influences P (phenotype) is so complex that it is uncertain what would happen under changed circumstances” (Sesardic 1993). Thus, Sesardic does not see a large problem in that the analysis is local, and he holds that it still traces causal relations. Sesardic is clearly negative to the norm of reaction analysis. He finds it impossible and uninteresting to assess all possible environments, and argues that it is the effect of genotype given the dominant environments that are interesting. 
      
5. Genetic variation as triggering cause
I suggest that the distinction between structuring and triggering causes will illuminate important differences in the views of Lewontin and Sesardic on genetic causation. The distinction is suggested by Fred Dretske (1995), and for now, I buy into most of his analyses of it. However, I will not use the distinction for the same purpose as Dretske. His main agenda is to show how mental events can be viewed as structuring causes and neurobiological events as triggering causes of behavior. By developing this distinction he wants to argue that extrinsic factors can be decisive for mental content without undermining the thesis that the mental supervenes on the biological.   
      Dretske starts his analysis of triggering and structuring causes by focusing on the context-sensitiveness of causal explanations. He assumes the validity of the following claim: “Almost any event, E, depends on a great variety of other events in such a way as to make any of them eligible, given the right context, for selection as the cause in a causal explanation of E (Dretske 1995, p. 121). One example, used by Dretske, explaining the suggested distinction is the scenario where an operator moves the cursor on a screen by pressing a key on the keyboard. In this situation the pressure on the key is the triggering cause of cursor movement. But there are several other relevant conditions that could serve as a causal explanation of that same event. Examples of such conditions are the actual electrical connections in the computer (hardware) and programming (software). However, in the present scenario, hardware and software are thought of as background conditions or part of normal circumstances, although highly causally relevant for the outcome of the key pressing event. These can be thought of as structuring causes. The triggering cause is the cause we normally ask for in a defined causal context, while the structuring causes are all the relevant causal factors thought of as background conditions in the same causal context.
      In normal circumstances, the cause we ask for is the triggering cause. However, the term “normal circumstances” is problematic, as “normal circumstances” may mean different things to different people. Usually when we ask why the cursor moves, the causal explanation would be, “because the key was pressed”. But for a computer repairer or a programmer, this might not be the first causal explanation that comes into mind. From this follows that the triggering cause will vary with varying contexts of causal explanation.
      I find that in the discussion of heritability analysis the distinction between structuring and triggering causes comes in very handy. I find the distinction to illuminate what are important differences in the views of genetic causation of Lewontin and Sesardic. The causes asked for in heritability analysis are genetic and environmental variations, and can be thought of as triggering causes in this context. In heritability measurements conducted in a chosen set of environments there are important background conditions that are viewed as “normal circumstances”. These are, among others, (1) the influence of the certain environments chosen, which can be seen as analogous to the software in the computer example, and (2) the underlying multiple causal pathways inside the organisms and between the organism and its surroundings, including complex feedback systems and multi-level mechanisms, which can be seen as analogous to the hardware in the computer example. These conditions are causally relevant for the outcome of heritability analyses, however, they are not the causes asked for. They are structuring causes in the context of heritability analysis. 
      In heritability analysis the variation in genotype (or environment) is the factor that makes a difference given certain background conditions, expecting that if the conditions changes, the effect would be different. However, the success of the analysis is based on that the background conditions do not change to a great extent. Lewontin emphasizes what happens when background conditions do change, he focuses on the importance of differing environments and on the complex multiple causal pathways that are not allowed a role in heritability analysis. What he seems to find important is the structuring causes and the fact that they are plastic and changing.
      Sesardic is not very interested in the plasticity or the potential plasticity of structuring causes. He focuses on finding genetic or environmental causes by accepting a degree of fixation of other causal pathways, a widely used way of tracing causes in scientific research. What he seems to find important is the triggering causes of heritability analysis.  
      Assuming the validity of this distinction, both Sesardic and Lewontin are concerned with tracing causes, but Sesardic downplays the structuring causes while Lewontin emphasizes them. An important question is then if one of them is more justified than the other in holding his view. The answer seems to be: “it depends”. It depends on the context of analysis and on what questions are asked. In the case of IQ measurements, Lewontin would probably be right in emphasizing structuring causes, because the background conditions for IQ heritability analysis seems to be very plastic and therefore limiting for the success of the heritability analysis (see e.g. Turkheimer et al 2003). Sesardic’s position might be generally problematic as plasticity of structuring causes are, and should be expected to be, prevalent in nature and in biology. However, Sesardic seems to accept that the causal information is limited when background conditions are expected to change. His main example for showing the usefulness of heritability analyses is the one of cancer research. When it comes to cancer research, it seems justified to focus on genetic variation as a triggering cause, because the goal of the investigation is to single out causal factors for further analysis and not to use a quantification as basis for developing social policies. Thus, possible plasticity in background conditions will not matter to the same extent, and the goal of analysis is not as ambitious as for the IQ case.
      Heritability analysis picks out genetic variation or genetic differences as triggering causes. Lewontin might argue that heritability does not trace the right or appropriate triggering causes. What I conceive as structuring causes in heritability analyses might deserve the attention as triggering causes, but then other types of questions are needed than questions about the relative contribution of genotype and environment to phenotypic traits. The triggering causes in the context of heritability analysis are genes or genetic variation (and environment or environmental variation). These are assumed to be relevant causal factors. Whether these are valid causal factors or categories can be discussed, and is doubted, to some degree by Lewontin. They are not obvious causal candidates in the same way as the pressing of a key. They are rather theoretical entities that include a variety of processes, although scientific investigation can be said to support their use.
      There is a slightly different tension in the discussion between Lewontin and Sesardic, which regards local versus global analysis of causes. Lewontin criticizes heritability analysis for not tracing general, global and functional relationships between genotype, environment and phenotypic traits. Local analysis of causes may correspond to the view of “triggering causes”, but global analysis of causes hardly corresponds to the view of “structuring causes”. Lewontin’s criticism that analysis of variance does not reflect global causal relations may seem to reflect that Lewontin expects to find general and law-based relations in biology. However, in his analyses of norms of reaction the causation involved does not show the prevalence of regularities. The graphs might be non-continuous or with strange shapes and sharp turns. The global causation that Lewontin seems to talk about is rather a causal analysis that takes into account the outcomes of many different situations, and these need not be global in the meaning of law-like, general or regular. 
      Lewontin’s criticism can in this respect also be interpreted somewhat differently. I think it is reasonable to suggest that a view of causes as tightly connected to laws is close to a widespread use in everyday language about science. When the public is presented with scientific results telling that IQ is genetically caused, it might easily be taken to mean something like a law-like relationship and not a local result as is the case using the analysis of variance. If this is the situation, it is very reasonable for Lewontin to criticize the analysis of variance for not reflecting universalizability, as this is what often would be interpreted as the result by policymakers.

6. Differing motivations and contexts of discussion
In ruthless terms Sesardic judges the norm of reaction to be uninteresting and of limited application. In similar harsh terms Lewontin claims that the analysis of variance has no use at all. He states that “in view of the terrible mischief that has been done by confusing the spatiotemporally local analysis of variance with the global analysis of causes, I suggest that we stop the endless search for better methods of estimating useless quantities” (Lewontin 1976a, p. 192). Both argue that their opponent’s preferred method is obscure and useless, while it seems to me that both approaches are valuable related to different interests. 
      I suggest that some of this apparent disagreement lies in different contexts and agendas for discussion. I interpret Lewontin’s aim to be to convince that heritability measurements are useless in the conduct of finding out which social policies are not worthwhile the resources used on them due to high heritability of certain traits. He holds that “(t)he fallacy is that a knowledge of the heritability of some trait in a population provides an index of the efficacy of environmental or clinical intervention in altering the trait either in individuals or in the population as a whole” (Lewontin 1976a, p. 179). An intensely debated example is the question whether it is any use in policies aiming to improve intelligence in populations of lower performance, if IQ is measured to have a high heritability (see e.g. Block and Dworkin 1976). Lewontin’s strong assertions need to be evaluated on this background, as he, well argued, finds heritability measurements of very limited application in this respect. Sesardic seems to agree with Lewontin’s locality objection. But he strongly disagrees that heritability measurements and the analysis of variance are totally useless on this background. He points to important application in cancer research, where heritability analysis can be used to single out what factors are causally relevant in cancer development. He holds that the analysis of variance cannot provide the full causal story about how, and under what conditions, the cancer develops. But he finds it certainly not to be the case that no causal information can be drawn from the analysis; it can help to find what factors are causally relevant for further analyses (Sesardic 1993, p. 405). This kind of application seems to me evidently useful, and I would find it strange if Lewontin would not acknowledge this type of use of heritability analysis. When Lewontin claims that the method is totally useless, I think it is reasonable to interpret him as still speaking in the context of social policy changes, and that he might be open to Sesardic’s suggestions of other reasonable applications, which are set in totally different contexts. 
      When it comes to Sesardic’s strong criticism of the norm of reaction, one weakness pointed to is that Lewontin mainly refers to relatively simple traits (e.g. enzyme activity optima relating to temperature) when explaining its importance. For many high-complexity-traits it would not be possible to produce environments that would cover the entire norm of reaction. However, Lewontin recognizes the same problem: “In man, measurements of reaction norms for complex traits are impossible because the same genotype cannot be tested in a variety of environments” (Lewontin 1976a, p. 190).  However, this does not have to render the norm of reaction analysis totally uninteresting, as Sesardic seems to argue. The norm of reaction analysis rather points to the importance of assessing all environments available, so that non-valid extrapolations are not made. Having it in mind also reminds of the important limitations of the analysis of variance. However, I find that central questions to assess in relation to the norm of reaction analysis are if environments outside historically normal environments are interesting in the causal analysis of genotype and environment? Do they tell anything about the causal potential or capacity of genes and environments?

7. Concluding remarks 
As I have argued, I find the distinction of triggering and structuring causes to illuminate some important points about genetic causation and about the differences in views that have been presented. A triggering cause is picked out as what is making a difference given a certain background, and relevant background conditions can be viewed as structuring causes. This conception of causation is to some extent pragmatic, as it depends on context and interests what are considered triggering causes and what are considered structuring causes. Even though individuation of the triggering causes depends on the context of analysis, the causes picked out need not be less real; however, the triggering cause can be seen as having a different status than other causal relevant conditions. Triggering causes are singled out through the analysis of variance and heritability measurements and corresponds to a singular and local analysis of genetic and environmental variation as causes. 
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